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The decisive factor which set Europe on the road to 
unity was a political one and not the result of a 
calculation about economic convenience. The 
absence of this factor explains the failure of the 
efforts made in Latin America to achieve effective 
co-operation in intra-regional trade or to unite 
national efforts around something more effective 
than joint statements. 
The author argues that if it is to change its trade 
relations with the European Economic Community 
and with the rest of the industrialized world, the 
region will have to diversify its exports, especially by 
incorporating manufactures. This requires a policy 
of import substitution which takes that final goal 
into consideration, effective co-operation in intra-
regiona) trade, and disciplined use of joint imports to 
improve access to world markets. 
Up till now the region has believed that the 
export of raw materials would be sufficient to cope 
with its growth problems and to provide industry 
with the input and machinery it needs for its opera-
tion. However, the increasing difficulty of placing 
commodit ies in the industrialized countries, 
together with the heavy burden of external debt, has 
undermined the growth strategy based on this 
approach. Therefore, unless Latin America estab-
lishes a financial and trade relationship with the 
developed countries which satisfies its development 
requirements, very profound political changes may 
be brought about. Or perhaps, as in Europe, these 
upheavals may produce the necessary energy for the 
adoption of a new growth strategy based on regional 
integration. 
•Consultant to several United Nations and private 
bodies. 
There is no lack of opinions —very respecta-
ble ones indeed— which hold that it is not worth 
the trouble to return once again to the relations 
between Latin America and the European Com-
munities since these relations are beset with 
insuperable obstacles such as the common agri-
cultural policy. Without denying the validity of 
this viewpoint, it is worth exploring, on the basis 
of this reality, the road which Latin America 
should take now that the post-colonial stage in 
its relations with, the Old World has been 
completed. 
The issue goes beyond farming, since for 
some years now it has not been only the coun-
tries exporters of foodstuffs which have been 
encountering difficulties in placing their pro-
ducts and indeed in obtaining reasonable prices; 
instead the problem has extended to almost all 
raw materials, including now oil. Nor are the 
disappointments limited to trade, for Latin 
America is concerned about, and even hurt by, 
the knowledge that Europe gives the region the 
lowest of priorities in its relations with the rest 
of the world. 
Whereas the United States has never dis-
criminated in its imports of tropical farm pro-
ducts, Europe does do so in favour of its recent 
colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, 
although it was from Europe that the colonizers 
of Latin America set out and it was Europe which 
for many decades provided the main market for 
our region's exports. In contrast, the United 
States for better or for worse has always main-
tained its relations with Latin America at a high 
level. 
I 
The creation of the 
European Communities 
The unification of Europe at the end of the 
Second World War inspired Latin America to do 
the same. The failure of this initiative did not 
lead to a better understanding among the par-
ties: in the EEC Commission it is often said that 
one of the difficulties of communicating with 
Latin America is that it does not speak with one 
voice. 
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The reasons which made possible the estab-
lishment of the European Economic Community 
on 1 January 1958 were political. The emergence 
in the postwar period of two superpowers, the 
Soviet Union and the United States, relegated 
the European nations to the second rank. The 
fact that for centuries Europe had led the world 
in political, trade and military matters under-
lined the need to overcome old hostilities and 
forget the bloodshed in order to advance towards 
a unity which would restore the lost importance. 
To this was added the fear that communism 
would spread from Eastern Europe to the rest of 
the continent. 
Another motive for European unity was the 
concern that, acting individually, each country 
would seek in a bilateral alliance with the United 
States a guarantee against the communist threat. 
The countries would thus become aligned, some 
with the USSR and others with the United States, 
and this bipolarity would increase the danger of a 
new war. In contrast, if Europe made itself into a 
third power capable of speaking as an equal with 
each of the sides, it would be able to act as a 
moderator in the conflicts, a role which it has in 
fact played all these years. 
It was the desire for peace and not for eco-
nomic advantages which produced the European 
common market. The reason for the repeated 
failure of similar initiatives in Latin America is 
precisely that the only driving-force has been an 
interest in the commercial benefits which might 
result from an expanded market. 
The fundamental purpose in Europe was, on 
the one hand, to negotiate on an equal footing 
with the USSR with an eye on the advance of 
communism and, on the other, to make an 
alliance with the United States —which explains 
why that country from the outset supported the 
format ion of the European Economic 
Community. 
That the creation of the Community was not 
viewed with disapproval by the United States 
can be seen from the speech made by President 
Kennedy on 4 July 1962 when he proposed an 
association between "... the new union now 
emerging in Europe and the old union founded 
in North America 175 years ago". He added: 
"The United States views this vast undertaking 
with hope and admiration. We do not see a 
strong and united Europe as a rival but as an ally. 
To co-operate in this undertaking has been the 
basic goal of our foreign policy for 17 years". For 
the Soviet Union, however, the European Eco-
nomic Community has never ceased to be the 
commercial arm of NATO and, although this is 
quite contrary to its interests, it has still not 
recognized the Community's existence nor has 
an agreement been signed with COMECON. 
An essential condition for a country to be a 
member of the European Economic Community 
is that it must have a democratically elected 
government. Although Article 237 of the Treaty 
of Rome establishes the right of all European 
countries to join the EEC, once the admission 
agreement is approved by the parliaments con-
cerned, a doctrine is applied which corrects what 
the Treaty provides and gave birth to the so-
called "Birkelbach Report" which states, inter 
alia, that "States whose Governments lack 
democratic legitimacy and whose peoples do not 
participate in the decisions of the Government 
either directly or through freely elected repre-
sentatives may not seek to join the Community". 
The application of this doctrine prevented 
Greece, Spain and Portugal from joining the EEC 
for many years, for their Governments were not 
democratic even though they were of the right. 
Here again can be seen the different weight of 
the political element in the integration process 
of Latin America, for not only has Latin America 
not demanded that a government be democratic 
as a qualification for entry but also, on the occa-
sion of the rejection of Cuba's request for admis-
sion to LAFTA, the arguments brandished about 
were not political but related to the technical 
incompatibility of the centralized Cuban eco-
nomic system with the system of tariff preferen-
ces which operated in LAFTA. 
Latin America has never had the purpose of 
achieving true integration nor has it had political 
objectives in view, in contrast to what happened 
¡n Europe where the United Kingdom refused to 
join the Coal and Steel Community when it could 
not accept the supranational powers conferred 
on that body. In other words, compromises were 
made on many points in order to achieve a united 
Europe and the various parties yielded in their 
positions in order to reach agreement, but no 
dealing was accepted whenever vital considera-
tions were at stake, such as the supranationality 
of the authorities of the integration organs 
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which is designed to make Europe one day into a 
single country or the political systems of the 
countries of Europe, which had to ensure respect 
for human rights. 
Two aspects of the creation of the European 
Economic Community were negative for Latin 
America: the common agricultural policy and 
the special link with the old colonies. However, 
the creation of the EEC would not be thought 
necessarily to have harmed Latin American 
The desire to give priority to its relations with its 
former colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Carib-
bean ( ACP countries) offers a partial explanation 
for the European Economic Community's lack of 
interest in Latin America. This attitude origi-
nated in the concern of France, when the discus-
sions about the formation of the Community 
began in 1957, that the colonial empire which it 
had at that time should have some access to the 
united Europe that was coming into being. 
France then possessed territories in Africa; Bel-
gium had the Congo and administered Rwanda 
and Burundi, under a trusteeship agreement 
with the United Nations, in the same way that 
Italy administered Somalia. 
France argued successfully in the EEC for a 
system under which in exchange for financial 
and trade advantages granted by the colonies to 
the new united Europe, Europe would contribute 
to their economic and social development with 
cash subventions, technical assistance and tariff 
preferences for the import of certain products, 
and these terms remained in place when shortly 
afterwards the colonies achieved their 
independence. 
Early in the 1970s, when the United King-
dom joined the European common market, sim-
ilar treatment was obtained for a part of what 
remained of its colonial empire, together with a 
guarantee that the preferences would be main-
tained for some imports from former colonies, 
such as beef and butter from New Zealand. This 
interests. On the contrary, a world controlled by 
a single superpower is an inhospitable one for 
medium-sized and small countries, for it leaves 
them no other choice than to align themselves 
with it. The existence of two superpowers com-
pels bipolarity, while the emergence of a third 
great trading force such as the EEC gives these 
countries greater mobility and brings the world 
closer to effective multilateralism. 
being the case, when Spain began to negotiate 
for entry the Commission of the European Com-
munity requested it to clarify its relationship 
with Latin America, in order to prevent obsta-
cles from arising later to the application of the 
common trade policy. In other words, the Com-
munity made sure that Spain would not request, 
as France, Belgium and the United Kingdom had 
done, special treatment for countries which once 
formed part of its empire. 
The first convention between the EEC and 18 
of its former colonies was concluded at Yaounde 
on 20 June 1963 and the second at Lomé on 28 
February 1975 with the signature of 46 former 
colonies. The next convention was ratified on 30 
October 1979 with 64 former colonies. The con-
vention in force since 1985 covers 65 former 
colonies. 
One of the benefits enjoyed by the signato-
ries of the Lomé Convention is that the greater 
part of their exports enter the EEC tariff-free, an 
exception being maçje ¡n the case of products 
covered by the common agricultural policy. In 
this latter case the advantages are limited by 
quotas. These preferences have helped to 
improve the economic situation of the former 
colonies; it may be noted, for example, that rice 
enters the EEC on payment of a very low import 
duty, less than half the duty levied cm other 
countries, including those of Latin America. 
However, the preferences do have limita-
tions which impede a greater improvement in 
II 
The colonial legacy 
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the economies of the countries concerned. For 
instance, there is no preferential treatment for 
raw materials and fuels since they are not taxed 
in the EEC; generally speaking, the growth of 
exports of foodstuffs is limited by quotas, and the 
treatment accorded to manufactures is not very 
favourable: for example, imports of cocoa butter 
is subject to a duty of 16% when they come from 
the ACP countries, whereas grain enters duty-
free. 
This colonial relationship has had a strong 
influence on the low priority which Europe 
accords to Latin America, for it reserves its best 
efforts for the 65 ACP countries. France is parti-
cularly zealous in this respect, to the point of 
making it a rule to prevent any funds being 
furnished or efforts being made with respect to 
non-ACP countries. Some weight also seems to 
be given to the idea that co-operation with Latin 
America amounts to competition with the Uni-
ted States and that therefore Europe should keep 
its distance. It is often not clear whether this is 
done out of respect for what is considered to be 
the sphere of influence of the United States or 
out of fear of giving the United States grounds 
for intervening in the affairs of the 65 APC 
countries. 
For example, in September 1980 the Com-
munity's Directorate General of External Affairs 
proposed to the Commission a revision of the 
EEC's policy towards Latin America. In support 
of this change it prepared a lengthy document 
stressing Latin America's importance now and 
up to the end of the century, stating: "The Com-
munity would be letting slip one of the great 
opportunities of the past quarter of a century if it 
did not give due attention to its relations with 
Latin America". It then presented a fairly mod-
est plan for establishing links which did not go 
so far as to recommend more staff members to 
deal with the problems, although it did suggest 
some plans for visits and meetings. After exa-
mining the proposal the Commission rejected it 
despite its low cost. 
A second example of discrimination against 
Latin America is provided by an initiative taken 
by the region and supported by some Europeans, 
mainly Italians, with a view to finding some 
fruitful area of co-operation between the EEC and 
Latin America. The chosen area was the cam-
paign against foot-and-mouth disease. In May 
1979 the diplomatic missions of Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay submitted a 
report on this topic, subsequently supported by 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru. This report 
stated that foot-and-mouth disease affected the 
meat-producing countries, mainly beef produc-
ers (but also producers of pork and lamb), block-
ing their access to main world markets for fresh, 
chilled, and frozen meat and limiting it in the 
others; this means a reduction of 25 % in produc-
tion, both of meat and of milk, and that the 
export prices of beef are usually, every time 
supply exceeds demand, up to 50% lower than 
those for other countries free of foot-and-mouth 
disease. The report added that, since the EEC 
countries had made great progress in the eradi-
cation of foot-and-mouth disease from their own 
territory and in so doing had acquired very valua-
ble experience (from specific vaccines for each 
case to effective inspection systems), there were 
broad possibilities for co-operation between the 
EEC and several countries of Latin America. 
The Commission decided that the pro-
gramme provided a suitable working basis and it 
decided that six experts should visit the coun-
tries concerned during the period October to 
December 1980 in order to produce a report and 
propose appropriate measures. The Commis-
sion's veterinary services then convened a meet-
ing with diplomatic representatives of the 
countries interested in examining the results of 
the mission to discuss the methods which should 
be pursued. After this preliminary stage an 
actual anti-foot-and-mouth programme was to 
begin. As time was passing and there was no 
news, enquiries were made at one of the periodic 
meetings of the Heads of Mission of the Latin 
American countries with the Commission's ser-
vices. The reply was that the Community would 
not undertake a major programme with Latin 
America in this or in any other area. 
Reference was made earlier to the impor-
tance of the help which the former colonies of 
the EEC receive for their export products, but in 
fact almost the only thing which they can export 
without restrictions is raw materials. For this 
reason, as has happened with Latin America, 
their share in the Community's imports is dec-
lining: from 8.3% in 1970 to only 5.5% in 1984. 
This experience of the ACP countries in their 
relations with their former metropolitan coun-
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tries merely confirms the conviction that the 
time has come for Latin America to try to 
achieve a turnaround in its co-operation with the 
EEC. This does not mean that the assistance 
which the Community furnishes at times of dis-
aster or to very poor regions is not appreciated, 
but when the amounts used for these purposes 
The difficulties experienced by the EEC countries 
with other foodstuffs exporters, including those 
of Latin America, could have been avoided if at 
the time of the formation of the Community 
farm products had been excluded from the 
Treaty, as was later done by the countries which 
set up the European Free Trade Association. 
This did not happen because of France's great 
desire, supported by Italy and the Netherlands, 
to be able to export its agricultural production to 
the rest of the Community and because all the 
parties recognized the need to prevent a situa-
tion in which very large differences in food pri-
ces would have a different effect on the labour 
costs of industries which were supposed to be 
free from ¡nter-community competition. 
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome states the 
purposes of the common agricultural policy: to 
increase production; to promote a fair standard 
of living for the rural population; to establish 
markets; to guarantee supplies; and to ensure 
reasonable consumer prices. It can be said that 
the EEC has achieved all its proposed objectives 
except for the last one, for the prices which 
consumers pay are somewhat higher than those 
prevailing in other countries, such as the United 
States. 
From the strategic standpoint it is argued 
that it is not proper for Europe to depend exces-
sively on overseas supplies, in the light of its 
bitter experience in the two world wars. During 
both wars Germany suffered food shortages as a 
result of the British naval blockade and it put the 
United Kingdom in the same situation with its 
submarines. For these past reasons and to avoid 
—between US$ 50 and US$ 150 million over the 
years— are compared with the US$ 30 000 mil-
lion which the Latin American countries paid 
out in 1985 in interest on their external debt, it 
can be understood that this is not a matter which 
warrants the attention of governments. 
future difficulties, the Europeans think it neces-
sary to have a degree of self-sufficiency where 
food supplies are concerned. 
There are also economic arguments in 
favour of agricultural subsidies. Although it is 
true that in Europe food costs more than in the 
international market, it is equally true that this 
did not have any social repercussions when in 
January 1961 the common agricultural policy 
was set in motion, for at that time all the indus-
trialized countries were enjoying economic 
expansion unprecedented both in its intensity 
and in its duration. During the 1950s and 1960s 
living conditions in Europe improved to the 
point that the consumer could absorb the price 
increase without feeling it. It may be that now, 
when Europe's unemployment level shows no 
signs of declining because of its high labour 
costs, the price of food has some economic 
importance, but the public has already accepted 
it and in any event the governments are not 
taking action either with respect to the other 
reasons for the very high wages. 
The common agricultural policy might have 
been established at lower prices if the Federal 
Republic of Germany^ whose agriculture is less 
efficient than that of France and other EEC coun-
tries, had not succeeded in 1964 in increasing the 
grain prices contained in the Mansholt Plan. 
Now that the EEC would like to reduce grain 
production it was again West Germany which, in 
May 1985, vetoed a small reduction in the gua-
ranteed price to farmers and obliged the Com-
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The great industrial expansion which 
Europe experienced from the end of the 1950s 
up to 1973-1974 required large numbers of 
workers in the towns. It was feared at that time 
that the countryside would be depopulated and 
efforts were made to prevent this, at whatever 
cost, for it was believed that the countryside had 
a stock of human values not always found in the 
towns. One of these values is connected with the 
fact that, as the European producer usually owns 
his land, his outlook is more conservative than 
that of the industrial worker; it is therefore 
thought that keeping the largest possible pro-
portion in the countryside enhances political 
equilibrium. 
Another consideration taken into account in 
the policy is that neither in Europe nor any-
where else do consumers usually react in an 
organized manner against price increases. The 
agricultural producer, in contrast, protests when 
his remuneration is not what he expects, and in 
Europe they know how to do this very effectively 
by blocking the highway with tractors, tipping 
produce on to the roads, conducting a cow into 
the Commission building and also using their 
votes with determination to ensure that parlia-
mentarians attend zealously to their interests. It 
is thus understandable that European politicians 
should be more concerned with the agricultural 
vote in their districts than with what is thought 
of the excesses of the common agricultural policy 
in the United States or Latin America. 
With guaranteed and increasingly high farm 
prices, in a continent with good rainfall, with 
efficient machinery, with high quality chemical 
inputs and, above all, with the revolutionary 
seeds which genetics has made possible, it is 
natural that over these years capable producers 
like the Europeans should have exceeded all 
supply forecasts and should have achieved self-
sufficiency in many cases, obliging the Commis-
sion to store the surpluses which it later dumps 
on the international market at subsidized prices. 
At first the problems caused by the common 
agricultural policy affected almost exclusively 
the producers of milk and beef, so that they 
harmed the interests of only a few Latin Ameri-
can countries: Argentina, Paraguay and Uru-
guay; but when the subsidies transformed the 
EEC into a large-scale exporter of sugar and grain 
the damage spread. 
Of course grain, excluding rice, is an impor-
tant export only for Argentina, but the competi-
tion in the grain-based food markets is so fierce 
that it influences other products exported by 
Latin American countries, such as oil seeds and 
soya. Many countries are affected by the decline 
in the price of sugar; they are usually very poor 
countries with tropical climates which have few 
possibilities of cultivating other crops. The 
international price has declined ¡n recent 
months to barely a third of production costs, 
with the result that the most efficient countries 
are being displaced from the international 
market despite the fact that the EEC pays its 
farmers five times the international price and 
the United States four and a half times that price. 
An example of the damage caused by these 
subsidies is provided by Brazil, the world's prin-
cipal sugar producer and the third exporter after 
Cuba and France. Brazil's production price is 
approximately half that of the EEC, but owing to 
the fall in prices resulting from the subsidies 
paid by the industrialized countries, it has not 
been able to increase the volume of its exports. 
Brazil's foreign-exchange earnings on the sugar 
account declined from US$ 1 266 million in 1980 
to US$ 570 million in 1983-
Despite these conditions Latin America will 
continue to export farm products, for it has no 
other alternative. In doing this it has the unenvi-
able advantage of desperation, whereas the pro-
tectionist farm policies of countries such as the 
United States, the EEC, Canada and Australia are 
a response to electoral demands rather than to a 
foreign-exchange problem. For several Latin 
American countries agriculture is the only 
means of economic development and they need 
to export their harvests in order to survive. This 
will lead in all probability to a considerable 
expansion of the production of certain grains, 
especially soya and maize in Brazil and Argen-
tina, and of wheat in the latter country. 
The decline in international prices is produc-
ing very important changes in the supply struc-
ture in the developing countries. For example 
the international price of beef in recent years has 
reached such a low level that Argentina's pro-
ducers have opted to put their best land under 
cereals, the prices for which are also declining 
but still more profitable than for livestock. The 
gap left by Argentina in the international beef 
market has been filled by other countries, such as 
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Brazil and Uruguay, where the land is not always 
suitable for grain production. It might also 
happen, if grain prices fall even further, that the 
relationship between mean and grain will be 
reversed, and the cattle will return to the 
pampas. 
In its economic relations with the EEC up till 
now Latin America has focussed its efforts on 
trade negotiations designed to avoid or circum-
vent the barriers erected by the Community 
against Latin American exports of farm pro-
ducts. Nothing effective has been achieved des-
pite the considerable efforts made, which to a 
large extent have impeded the development of 
The basic economic difficulty of the countries of 
Latin America is that only Brazil and Mexico 
have managed to become relatively important 
exporters of manufactures, and these countries 
do not find their main advantage in technology, 
novelty or monopoly but in their low labour 
costs. Up to the 1970s the situation was much 
more favourable, for the industrialized countries 
were enjoying unprecedented economic expan-
sion. The developing countries, including those 
of Latin America, benefitted from this growth 
with its increased demand for raw materials, 
foodstuffs, energy and even light manufactured 
goods. During those years the most important 
thing was the hope, almost the certainty, that it 
would be possible to emerge from poverty towed 
by the very intense and apparently endless 
prosperity of the developed countries. 
Since that time the world has been turned 
upside down: the boom times have not returned, 
the demand for raw materials has ceased grow-
ing and their prices have declined. In addition, 
consumers in the industrialized countries 
instead of opting for more goods, prefer to have 
more services, such as holidays, health and edu-
cation, the production of which requires few 
metals or other commodities. Something similar 
is happening with the rapid expansion of the 
electronics industry which is creating incomes 
much more realistic political and economic 
relations. 
These claims are just, for the Community 
measures have interrupted the development of a 
commercial relationship which might be much 
more agreeable for Latin American interests, 
and they are causing the collapse of international 
prices. Since they are just, these protests will 
certainly continue to be made, but it should not 
be forgotten that they are hardly likely to be of 
any use since the Community's common agricul-
tural policy has proved to be irreversible. The 
solution will therefore have to be sought 
through other channels. 
and jobs but with a weak demand for what the 
developing countries export. Agriculture offers 
an even more gloomy picture, as was seen above. 
The principle that when the industrialized coun-
tries grow the other countries do likewise has 
thus ceased to operate. 
In addition to concentrating on its opportun-
ities to export farm products, raw materials and 
fuels, Latin America will have to press for a 
reasonable policy of substitution of industrial 
imports and promote its regional economic inte-
gration. However, if it is effectively to overcome 
problems of the external sector, it will have to 
become a major exporter of manufactures, prim-
arily to the industrialized countries. 
Goods for export should include first and 
foremost those which involve technology, 
novelty or monopoly, although it must be 
acknowledged that in no circumstances can our 
peoples produce goods which can be sold on 
their manufacture or design merits, for that 
requires conditions which only flourish when 
there is sufficient political stability, observance 
of the law by governors and governed, proper 
order in economic and administrative matters, 
serious cultural and technological training and a 
minimum accumulation of public and private 
capital, conditions which do not always obtain in 
the region. 
IV 
The export of manufactures 
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V 
The problems of the EEC 
One of the largest markets which Latin America 
could have for its manufactures is the European 
Community. However, the main economic prob-
lem now affecting the countries of the Commun-
ity is unemployment, so that imports of 
industrial goods are not always welcome. 
A high level of unemployment is not pecul-
iar to the EEC, for the United States is suffering 
the same misfortune. But the average unemploy-
ment rate in the Community is 1 1 % of the 
labour force, while in the United States it is only 
7%. This difference is due to the unequal crea-
tion of new jobs, for between 1972 and 1983 
wages in the United States declined by 37% in 
relation to the cost of capital, whereas in Europe 
there was no change. This is why European 
companies seek whenever possible to replace 
workers with larger capital investments and 
they have thus achieved a large increase in indus-
trial productivity with very low employment 
growth. This high rate of unemployment leads 
to forms of protectionism which limit and to 
some extent eliminate the possibility of exports 
of industrial goods from countries such as those 
of Latin America. 
In justification of protectionism it is argued 
that certain manufactures from the third world 
are very competitive because they are produced 
with very low labour costs combined with simple 
technology. In the developed countries these 
imports cause greater unemployment among 
poorly qualified manpower and they most affect 
those sectors of industry with the more obsolete 
machinery and working techniques. It is also 
asserted that in Europe workers enjoy good pro-
tection of their interests, whereas many enter-
prises in developing countries do not even apply 
the international rules adopted by the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation. 
Of course those who think that labour is too 
cheap in the developing countries have some 
justification; but the great differences in the pri-
ces of some products also result from the fact 
that the wages and social benefits of European 
workers are quite out of keeping with their 
productivity. 
Some developing countries have been suc-
cessful in exporting simple manufactures, and 
this has prompted the industrialized countries to 
adopt doubly restrictive measures in comparison 
with the ones which hinder trade among these 
countries themselves; but there are reasons for 
these differences of treatment. The industries in 
which the developing countries have achieved 
efficiency are those which in Europe and the 
United States employ large numbers of workers 
with little specialized training. When a factory 
closes in the electronics sector, the workers and 
technicians who worked in it have the training 
which makes it easy for them to find work in 
other businesses in the same sector, which is 
expanding throughout the world. But this does 
not happen when workers in the textiles or 
footwear industries find themselves without 
work, for employees here are very numerous and 
their poor qualifications make it difficult for 
them to relocate. The fact that the people who 
lose their jobs are very numerous and poorly 
trained only increases the political pressure on 
the government to provide protection. 
Another reason for the increase in protec-
tionism is the generally widespread geographi-
cal distribution of the simpler industrial 
activities. As they are operating in various areas 
of a country, businessmen and trade unions are 
able to bring pressure to bear on a larger number 
of deputies and senators than can a more special-
ized industry located in only one place in the 
country. Nor should it be forgotten that big 
importers such as the United States and Japan 
have a greater capacity than individual develop-
ing countries to take counter measures against 
protectionism. In addition, the European coun-
tries have succeeded in organizing themselves in 
an economic community which gives them a 
combined strength which they would never have 
had acting alone, whereas the developing coun-
tries always act individually, so that they are 
hardly in a position to call for understanding on 
the part of purchasers. 
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Latin America as a unit 
Just as the EEC has acquired great weight in 
international trade discussions by virtue of the 
fact that 12 countries speak with one voice, Latin 
America could also improve its negotiating 
capacity if its nations joined forces. This would 
not be so important if GATT recovered its former 
standing, but since the beginning of the 1970s 
cases of transgression of its rules have multip-
lied, and the worst thing is that those most guilty 
of this are its founding members. 
In November 1985 the United States and the 
EEC reached an agreement under which the EEC 
"voluntarily" agreed to limit its steel exports to 
the United States. However, the United King-
dom rejected the part of the arrangement which 
obliged the EEC to reduce its exports of semi-
finished steel by half. The United States, in an 
attempt to overcome the resistance of the Uni-
ted Kingdom, announced that unless the United 
Kingdom accepted its position it would close its 
market for this product completely by the end of 
the year. In turn, the EEC threatened the United 
States with reprisals if it did not restore the 
original quota. 
Trade reprisals, as a means of obtaining 
advantages in international trade, are not used 
only between the big countries but also against 
the others. Last year Canada decided that its beef 
imports from the EEC should be cut from 23 000 
to 2 700 tons per year. The Community made 
different calculations which gave it 10 668 tons 
and it convinced Canada that the Community's 
arithmetic was better, threatening it with an 
increase in import duties for several products, 
including processed foodstuffs and whisky. 
This is the world in which the countries of 
Latin America are trying to solve their problems 
by means of individual arrangements, either 
appealing for understanding or trying to make 
up for their lack of economic weight by talking 
louder. 
The region had an opportunity to remedy 
this situation when its governments decided in 
SELA to convene a meeting to deal with relations 
between Latin America and the EEC. They also 
arranged to hold a meeting of experts at Punta 
del Este from 20 to 24 November 1978 to make 
preparations for the ministerial meeting which 
was to take place the following year in Caracas. 
At this meeting the Argentine delegation 
submitted a proposal that Latin America, or 
some of its countries, should consider a method 
of reacting jointly whenever the EEC requested 
"voluntary" restrictions or some other proce-
dure which violated the spirit or letter of GATT. 
The fundamental reason for the proposal was 
that on 29 June 1978 the permanent representa-
tives of the EEC countries and of the Latin Amer-
ican countries accredited to the Community had 
approved a series of conclusions, including the 
following: "If the evolution of the imports of 
agricultural products from the EEC is taken into 
account, Latin America would be able to increase 
its share in the total of Community imports only 
by diversifying its exports, especially of indus-
trial products". 
This was the first recognition of the need to 
turn the page in the relations between the EEC 
and Latin America, put an end to the claims of a 
past which would not return, and initiate a rela-
tionship in which trade in manufactures would 
occupy a relevant position. 
However, protectionist pressures in the EEC 
continued to limit the export opportunities for 
industrial products, and this affected textiles, 
clothing, iron and steel products, footwear and 
shipbuilding. It was also clear that the resistance 
of Latin American countries acting in isolation 
was not sufficient to halt the advance of protec-
tionism. In the period 1975-1977 the country 
with the largest imports from the EEC (Brazil) 
accounted for only 1.58% of the Community's 
total exports to the world. In contrast, the com-
bined exports of the EEC to Latin America were 
large, as can be seen from the following table: 
EEC exports to Latin America (5.7% of the 
total) were equal to almost half of the EEC 
exports to the United States, and almost three 
times its exports to Japan. It was also thought 
that, while it was desirable for a larger number of 
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Latin American countries to join together, it was 
not essential for each and every one of them to 
do so, for six countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) 
accounted for 80% of the exports of the EEC to 
Latin America. 
The proposal, which was given the name of 
"symmetric treatment" provided that when the 
EEC requested the self-limitation of some indus-
trial products exported from the countries of 
Latin America or wished to extend an agreement 
beyond the expiry date, the countries should 
agree to enter into negotiations but announce 
that at the same time they would choose one or 
several of the Community's exports to Latin 
America which, taken together, had a similar 
value in the base year as well as a similar rate of 
growth; and the countries of Latin America 
would request a self-limitation of the export of 
these products on the part of the EEC similar to 
the limitation which the Community was 
requesting from them. It was explained that if 
the region or part of it approved such a policy 
towards the EEC it would have to do likewise 
with respect to any other of the world's deve-
loped countries in similar circumstances. 
In the following year the Latin American 
Council of SELA approved Decision 44 which 
included the concept of symmetric treatment, 
not in the precise and direct language of the 
original but in a diluted version and accompan-
ied with requests for co-operation and assistance 
that had nothing to do with the protection of the 
region's exports. The Decision thus dropped 
into oblivion, despite the fact that protectionism 
continued to spread in the industrialized coun-
tries and the situation of Latin America con-
tinued to deteriorate. 
It was not possible to adopt any useful deci-
sion because in SELA any decision requires the 
agreement of all the member countries, and this 
often leads to application of the lowest common 
denominator method. If there had been the will 
to adopt an effective procedure, at least a group 
of countries could have tried this approach at the 
margin of the system. It is clear that, with 
respect both to economic integration and to the 
possibility of Latin America speaking about its 
interests with a common voice, even the require-
ments of political necessity which once promp-
ted Europe to abandon its national positions to 
advance towards unity are still not present ¡n 
Latin America. 
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